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If the United States were subject to a terrorist nuclear
attack, its president would face overwhelming political
pressure to respond decisively. A well-prepared
response could help both to prevent additional attacks
and to bring the perpetrators to justice. An instinctive
response could be cataclysmically ineffective, inflicting
enormous collateral damage without achieving either
deterrence or justice. An international security doctrine
of Mutually Assured Support can make the response to
such attacks more effective as well as less likely—by
requiring preparations that reduce the threat. The doc-
trine requires all subscribing nations to mobilize fully in
support of the attacked nation, in return for a promise
of nonretaliation. It provides a vehicle for domestic and
international leadership, allowing the president to
engage the American people, from a position of
strength, around an issue that has had little public dis-
cussion. The authors describe its rationale, implica-
tions, and implementation.
Keywords: terrorism; nuclear weapons; confidence-
building measures; defense doctrine;
international security; risk
The leader of any nation attacked with a ter-rorist nuclear weapon will feel tremendous
political pressure to launch a massive response,
aimed at the dual goals of preventing additional
attacks and bringing the perpetrators to justice.
However, in an asymmetrical war, with widely
distributed and hidden enemies, a unilateral
response may further destabilize the world sys-
tem without achieving either goal. Rather than
rallying the civilized world to the attacked
nation’s side, such a response could drive others
away and amplify the spiral of carnage.
We propose an international security doc-
trine for responding to such calamities, which
should also reduce their likelihood of ever hap-
pening. The doctrine requires participating
nations to mobilize in ways that address the
attacked nation’s needs better than that nation
can alone. In return, the attacked nation will not
attack participating nations. After explaining the
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more precisely, then analyze its ramifications before, immediately after, and long
after an attack. Finally, we sketch the process for implementing the doctrine.
Rationale
During the cold war, the doctrine of mutually assured destruction codified
responses to a nuclear weapon attack and suggested ways to reduce the risks of
false alarms and escalating conflicts. Many people believe that it helped to stabi-
lize the world system during a perilous period. The doctrine’s credibility hinged,
among other things, on the nuclear powers’ ability to identify attackers unam-
biguously. With nuclear missiles, that identification was straightforward. The doc-
trine assumed that the nuclear powers would safeguard their weapons well
enough to prevent diversion, meaning that one nation could be held directly
responsible for any attack. The imperfect stability created by the prospect of
nuclear retaliation was strengthened by confidence-building measures (e.g., the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States–Soviet Union hot line) and
by military intelligence.
With asymmetrical warfare, that accountability is greatly diminished. The per-
petrators might represent no single nation, while distributing their activities over
many nations, which might be implicated for failing to stop them. The perpetra-
tors might be domestic, working through Web sites, prisons, or social groups.
They might create clues implicating innocent countries. They might steal
matériel from nations with such poor safeguards that the theft goes undetected.
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Public anger at the attack and public fear of another one will require national
leaders to take immediate, decisive action. Yet, unless the targets of that action
are universally condemned, the action itself might advance the aims of terrorists,
who routinely embed themselves in civilian populations, hoping for violent
reprisals that will mobilize support for their cause. The collateral damage from a
misdirected unilateral response to a terrorist nuclear attack could evoke interna-
tional condemnation that undermines support for the attacked nation and
reduces its ability to defend and avenge itself. No nation should be willing to take
that gamble. The cold war held the prospect of there being no tomorrow after a
massive nuclear attack. However, the worst imagined terrorist attack involves
“only” one or two “small” nuclear weapons. Most people will survive it, even in
the attacked country. They will live to judge other nations by their response to the
attack—and by their role in its happening.
An attacked nation has two needs that no civilized nation should deny: pre-
venting additional attacks and securing justice. Coordinated international action
should be able to achieve these aims more effectively than unilateral action.
However, such action cannot happen overnight. Rather, the pieces must already
be in place, so that the attacked nation has confidence that other nations will
immediately and effectively align themselves with its needs. The doctrine of
Mutually Assured Support provides the foundation for such guarantees. The next
section explicates its terms.
An attacked nation has two needs that no
civilized nation should deny: preventing
additional attacks and securing justice.
Coordinated international action should be
able to achieve these aims more effectively than
unilateral action.
The Doctrine of Mutually Assured Support
In the event of a nuclear weapon explosion on an attacked nation, participating
nations will immediately mobilize, taking extraordinary measures (1) to apprehend
and to deliver, to the attacked nation, all those involved with the attack and (2) to
prevent additional near-term attacks. Unless otherwise resolved, existing laws of
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the attacked nation will prevail. The attacked nation will not take unilateral action
against any nation that fulfills these conditions to its satisfaction. A mutually
acceptable process will coordinate actions and the evaluation of compliance.
We now define the terms, identifying issues that need to be resolved, in trans-
lating the doctrine into a workable agreement. The result might be embodied in
a formal treaty or a less formal understanding, like the Proliferation Security
Initiative, the voluntary multilateral effort to deny terrorists access to nuclear
materials, led by the United States and Russia (http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c10390
.htm).
Definition of terms
Nuclear weapon explosion: The agreement would be activated by an explosion
generating the energy equivalent of at least one kiloton of high explosives from a
nuclear reaction. A workable agreement will need to specify whether explosions
causing no casualties (e.g., duds, demonstrations) are included.
Attacked nation: A nation has been attacked if a nuclear weapon explodes on
its territory. The health and economic effects of radiological dispersion devices
(RDDs) are not severe enough to trigger the agreement. A workable agreement
will need to specify whether to include a nation that suffers major damage from
an attack on a neighbor.
Participating nations: A nation will need to demonstrate its commitment
clearly enough to convince others to accept its assurances. Some nations will see
themselves as particularly likely to be targets of attack or retaliation. Nonetheless,
all should feel sufficiently vulnerable to accept the (Rawlsian) “original position”
of not knowing to whom rules would be applied—which can encourage just poli-
cies. A workable agreement will need to address the status of nations that join
only after an attack but then pledge full compliance.
Immediately mobilize: Participating nations must act as soon as the event is
reported. That immediacy has symbolic importance, expressing international sol-
idarity, and practical importance, reducing the perpetrators’ chances of escaping
and attacking again. The technology exists for rapidly locating and characterizing
nuclear explosions. A workable agreement will need to provide trusted informa-
tion to nations lacking that technology.
Extraordinary measures: Participants will commit to specific actions, repre-
senting an all-out effort to aid the attacked nation. A workable agreement will
need to address the expectations for countries without the resources for effective
action (e.g., they might ask wealthier allies to fulfill their responsibilities or to
provide them with missing resources).
Apprehend and deliver: The attacked country will have jurisdiction over trying
and punishing all suspects, overriding any restrictions on extradition (e.g.,
between countries with and without capital punishment). A workable agreement
will need to specify standards of proof for invoking and terminating suspect status.
All those involved with the attack: Securing, transporting, and detonating a
nuclear weapon must involve many individuals, each with a support network. All
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are potentially culpable. A workable agreement will need to specify how broadly
to define “involved.” A broad definition (e.g., including people who do not report
suspicious activities) should increase vigilance and decrease passive complicity,
while increasing threats to civil liberties.
Prevent additional near-term attacks: To make further attacks less likely, nations
should undertake actions such as apprehending suspects, increasing surveillance,
and restricting movement (e.g., with curfews). A workable agreement will need
protocols for enacting and terminating these measures. A broad definition might
reduce immediate risks yet increase future ones (e.g., alienating minority com-
munities affected by police sweeps).
Existing laws of the attacked nation: Those laws will be known in advance,
allowing other nations to argue for exceptions—or refuse to cooperate, if they see
unacceptable provisions. A workable agreement will need to examine the bilat-
eral compatibility of key laws and monitor changes in them.
Unilateral action: The attacked nation will not violate the sovereignty of any
nation complying with the agreement. A workable agreement will need to define
sovereignty, drawing on international law (e.g., does it include financial assets?).
To its satisfaction: The attacked nation will be the arbiter of others’ compli-
ance. Only that control will satisfy its domestic political needs, recognizing the
tempering effects of later review. A workable agreement must create procedures
for demonstrating compliance.
Mutually acceptable process: Effective action will require extensive prepara-
tions. Those will include creating ways to share information that otherwise is hid-
den and coordinate personnel that otherwise distrust one another. A workable
agreement will need to show enough progress on these practical matters to create
confidence in it.
Incentives for Participation
For an agreement to hold, the parties must believe that it serves their best
interests. This section briefly considers the proposal’s implications before an
attack, in its immediate aftermath, and long afterward.
Prior to an attack
Although bringing perpetrators to justice is important, a nation’s primary con-
cern must be preventing attacks from happening at all. As a result, a compelling
agreement must help to disrupt terrorists’ plans. Despite its postattack focus, the
doctrine could prevent attacks in three ways.
One way follows from participants’ commitment to pursue “all those involved
in an attack.” Fear of pursuit should discourage some of the many individuals
essential to a complex mission, such as those providing financial support, money
laundering, computer programming, safe houses, site scouting, and equipment
storage. The willingness of these individuals to help any terrorist might decline if
they had to worry about being discovered as bit players in a nuclear plot. The
more collaborators who are dissuaded, the more difficult an attack becomes. The
civil liberties consequences of casting a broad net will be mitigated, if draconian
measures are activated only after an attack.
The second way that an agreement could reduce the nuclear threat is through
the preparations needed to give it credibility. Any honest information sharing
should limit terrorists’ freedom of action. Some countries are already engaged in
such information sharing. However, even staunch allies do not share everything,
lest they compromise their sources and methods. Countries without ongoing
relations may develop ties through third-party nations or personal contacts, fol-
lowing cold war precedents like the networks of physicists working against
nuclear proliferation, such as the World Federation of Scientists and supporters
of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
Finally, an agreement could reduce the threat of attack by encouraging
confidence-building measures that reduce a nation’s risk of being targeted for retal-
iation. For example, the chance to participate in the agreement might prompt a
nation to secure its nuclear materials better. Nations that cannot provide convinc-
ing evidence of such security might conclude that having nuclear weapons poses
too great a liability—given the risk of being held criminally negligent for their theft.
Immediately after an attack
Should worse come to worst, an attacked nation’s first goal will be to prevent
further attacks. The extraordinary support that an agreement promises should
provide welcome additions to a nation’s own capabilities, unless, of course, the
attack itself undermines faith in the agreement by suggesting that other partici-
pants lack the will or the ability to be worthy partners. The attacked nation would
certainly treat an agreement as abrogated if it believed that another nation had
gamed it. Nations that were still trusted could try to preserve their bilateral com-
mitments, even if the agreement’s overall integrity has been compromised.
An attack may be seen as having succeeded despite sincere efforts by all par-
ticipants. If so, then the agreement’s focal concern, activating extraordinary mea-
sures after an attack, should remain valid. Some people, especially those who
were skeptical to begin with, will ask why those actions were not taken earlier,
ignoring the conditions for their enactment. The attacked nation must feel able
to exercise its power as arbiter of other nations’ compliance. To that end, the
agreement will need mechanisms for demonstrating that participants are collect-
ing and sharing evidence, as well as hotly pursuing suspects.
Long after an attack
Whatever its underlying wisdom, an agreement will be judged by the events
that follow its adoption. If there are no attacks, then the agreement will receive
some credit, although probably less than it deserves. Nonevents attract less atten-
tion than events; success has many fathers. Nonetheless, the absence of an attack
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should help to sustain the agreement, perhaps even encourage additional agree-
ments for other weapons of mass destruction. Should an attack occur, all existing
political arrangements will be questioned. This agreement might survive for the
long term, if it were seen as having fulfilled its missions: preventing additional
near-term attacks and punishing the perpetrators. It might even be strengthened.
If an attack occurs without such an agreement in place, nations might be
moved to forge one, feeling remorse for not having thought about the unthink-
able and planned for the day after a nuclear attack. If the attacked nation’s uni-
lateral response were seen as ineffective (or even counterproductive), a future
agreement based on mutually assured support might seem particularly attractive.
Of course, any prediction about the aftermath of a cataclysmic attack must be
guarded. An existing agreement might be swept away in the turmoil, even if it
had reduced the risk and built international confidence. An agreement should be
discarded, if it had aided international subterfuge. An important reinforcing fac-
tor arises from the fact that there will be a tomorrow after a terrorist nuclear
attack, unlike the scenario envisioned during the cold war, where a successful
attack could have made retribution impossible.
Implementation
Two lines of preparatory work are needed to make an agreement feasible. One
involves embedding it in the fabric of international law, ensuring its compatibil-
ity with other agreements and taking advantage of their supporting institutions.
For example, the United Nations Charter (http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/),
in chapter VI, article 33 (on Pacific Settlement of Disputes), describes how “the
parties to any dispute . . . shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation,
enquiry, mediation . . . or other peaceful means of their own choice.” Article 42
describes the conditions for using force “to maintain or restore international
peace and security.” Article 51 addresses the “inherent right to individual and col-
lective self defense.” The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (http://www.un.org/
Depts/dda/WMD/treaty/), which limits state-controlled nuclear weapons, should
be strengthened by an agreement focused on nonstate actors. Article 6 of the
NPT has mechanisms for compliance monitoring that might be extended—with
or without invoking the NPT itself. Institutions with the competence and trust
needed to implement the agreement would need to be created.
The second line of preparatory work involves creating the technical monitor-
ing, reporting, and mobilizing mechanisms needed for rapid mobilization. That
preparation includes devising ways to share sensitive information and coordinate
field operations, without compromising methods or sources. The feasibility of
such procedures will depend on both science and politics. During the cold war,
the scientific community mobilized to create trusted forums for creating and
evaluating weapons control proposals. Some of that expertise is still relevant for
controlling terrorist nuclear weapons, but it needs to be supplemented by experts
in anthropology, criminology, and other fields.
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An agreement implementing the doctrine could proceed through multilateral
or bilateral discussions, with hesitant nations observing the progress of those
examining it actively. Countries whose domestic politics preclude signing an
agreement might reach implicit understandings—supported by backchannel com-
munications. For example, it has been rumored that in the 1970s, non-OPEC
countries agreed informally to supply oil to any country subject to a boycott. Any
public discussion of these issues should create better understanding of the threat
of a nuclear attack (which citizens might otherwise overestimate or underesti-
mate) and of the hard choices facing national leaders should one occur. Unless
such discussions prepare the groundwork, leaders will have little hope of resist-
ing the pressure for a visceral response.
Conclusion
The darkest fear of our era is terrorist nuclear bombs exploding in major cities.
Yet, there is little public discussion or visible international planning for respond-
ing to such attacks. Without planning, the response is likely to be spasmodic, inef-
fective, unilateral retaliation. With planning, leaders might activate a coordinated
international response that increases the chances of avoiding further attacks and
bringing the guilty to swift, harsh justice.
An international agreement embodying the doctrine of Mutually Assured
Support would reduce the probability of terrorists exploding nuclear weapons,
while making their possession less attractive. If worse came to worst, agreements
based on the doctrine could still buy leaders the time they need for a measured
response and deny terrorists the international schisms that they seek.
